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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the status, rights and obligations of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) under international law, focusing in particular on international human rights, 
investment, environmental and criminal law. Private companies wield increasing 
economic and social power, frequently rivalling the one of states. While they are 
thereby in a position to contribute to the economic and technological development of 
societies, they can also harm human rights, damage the environment, or commit 
crimes. Domestic law has proven to be insufficient to promote the positive effects of 
business by safeguarding a stable and reliable economic environment, and to curb the 
negative effects by ensuring accountability. Assessing MNCs in the framework of 
international law, this paper comes to the conclusion that, independent of whether or 
not MNCs have international legal personality, they enjoy considerable rights under 
international investment law and under international human rights law. Conversely, 
MNCs do not have binding obligations under international law, notwithstanding a 
range of initiatives, attempting to create, both, voluntary and non-voluntary 
instruments. 
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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Jan Wouters 
Anna-Luise Chané 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The past four decades have witnessed a dramatic rise of globalised business. Today, 
an estimated 100,000 multinational corporations (MNCs) account for about a quarter 
of the global gross domestic product (GDP)1 and generate a turnover which exceeds 
the public budget of many states.2 The private sector wields considerable economic 
and social power and even increasingly expands into traditionally state-run sectors, 
fulfilling (quasi-)governmental functions by providing infrastructure, housing, and 
health services or organizing elections.3  
 
MNCs can thereby contribute to the economic and technological development of 
societies,4 but also harm human rights, damage the environment, or even commit 
crimes. National legislation is often unable to create a stable regulatory environment 
in which MNCs can operate, as well as to exercise control over the harmful acts of 
entities which fragment their activities globally, operate in decentralised network 
structures, and flexibly relocate operations and profits. 5  In addition, economically 
weaker states depend on the investments of MNCs and may be unwilling to enact 
and enforce demanding human rights and environmental standards in order to 
enhance their attractiveness to foreign investors.6 
 
The perceived inadequacy of domestic legislation to effectively regulate the activities 
of MNCs has moved the focus to the level of international law. Two dynamics are 
discernible. Firstly, acknowledging the beneficial effects of international business, 
efforts have been made to provide companies with a stable environment by granting 
them rights under international investment and international human rights law. 
Secondly, reacting to repeated reports about involvement of MNCs in human rights 
abuses, grave environmental damages and crimes, a number of initiatives have 
aimed at holding companies accountable under international human rights, 
environmental and criminal law. 
 
After a short overview of the terminological indeterminacy of the subject matter (II.), 
this chapter will analyse whether MNCs are subjects of international law (III.) and 
whether they have rights (IV.) and obligations (V.) under international law. The focus 
will lie on four legal fields whose recent developments have particularly impacted the 
                                                     
1
 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development’ 
(2011) UN Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2011, 24 and web table 34, 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2034.pdf> accessed 5 December 2013. 
2
 See John Mikler, ‘Global Companies as Actors in Global Policy and Governance’ in John Mikler (ed), 
The Handbook of Global Companies (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 1, 4 ff. 
3
 Alexandra Gatto, Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights: Obligations under EU Law and 
International Law (Elgar 2011) 4. 
4
 Olivier De Schutter, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, Nicolas Hachez and Mattias Sant’Ana, ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment, Human Development and Human Rights: Framing the Issues’ (2009) 3 Human Rights & 
International Legal Discourse, 137, 159. 
5
 Gatto (n 3) 14; Nicolás Zambrana Tévar, ‘Shortcomings and Disadvantages of Existing Legal 
Mechanisms to Hold Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Violations’ (2012) 4 
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 398, 400. 
6
 Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet, ‘Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective’ 
(2008) 6 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 262; Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert, 
‘Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights Abuses in the European Union: The Challenge of 
Jurisdiction’ (2009) 40 The George Washington International Law Review 939 f. 
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status of MNCs under international law: human rights protection and responsibilities, 
investment protection, environmental obligations, and accountability for international 
crimes. 
 
II. DEFINITION 
 
The discussion about MNCs has been characterised by a wealth of different 
terminologies. 7  In the United Nations (UN) framework the term ‘multinational 
corporations’ was originally used and defined as ‘enterprises which own or control 
production or service facilities outside the country in which they are based’.8 This 
terminology changed into ‘transnational corporation’9 to emphasise the cross-border 
operation of the respective company and to distinguish it from such ‘multinational 
corporations’ which are ‘owned and controlled by entities from several countries’.10 
However, this distinction was later abandoned and the 2003 UN Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights define the ‘transnational corporation’ as an ‘economic entity 
operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two 
or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or 
country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively’.11  
 
OECD and ILO instruments, on the other hand, employ the term ‘multinational 
enterprises’.12 The OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises – rejecting the need 
for a precise definition – describe them as follows:  
 
These enterprises operate in all sectors of the economy. They usually comprise 
companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that 
they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these 
entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, 
their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational 
enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, State or mixed.13  
 
The terminological confusion is perpetuated in international legal scholarship. Even 
though scholars have attributed different meanings to the adjectives ‘transnational’ 
and ‘multinational’14 and even though ‘corporation’ can be understood more narrowly, 
designating a legal entity characterised by ‘legal personality, transferable shares, 
limited liability, centralised management and investor ownership’, 15  the terms are 
                                                     
7
 See inter alia Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet, ‘Rechten en plichten van (multinationale) ondernemingen 
in het internationaal recht’ in Robby Houben and Stefan Rutten (eds), Actuele problemen van financieel, 
vennootschaps- en fiscaal recht. Feestbundel 20 jaar Werkgroep financieel recht (Intersentia 2007) 333, 
335 ff. 
8
 Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on 
Development and on International Relations (1974) UN Doc E/5500/Rev.1, ST/ESA/6, 25. 
9
 See for instance the UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UNCHR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (26 August 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Draft Norms). 
10
 Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 6. 
11
 Draft Norms para 20. 
12
 See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) 
<www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf> accessed 5 December 2013; ILO, Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th edn, 2006) 
<www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf> accessed 5 December 2013. 
13
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (n 12), part I, ch I, at 4; see ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (n 12) at 6. 
14
 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 199 ff; Gatto (n 3) 38. 
15
 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2010). 
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generally used synonymously. This terminological indeterminacy results from an 
inevitable ‘degree of arbitrariness’16 but it also mirrors the existing factual disorder. 
MNCs today comprise multiple business entities of various legal forms and display 
diverse forms of integration. 17  As Gatto has observed, MNCs have ‘no coherent 
existence as a legal entity [but are] a political and economic reality which articulates 
itself in a confusing variety of legal forms and devices.’18 It is therefore more helpful to 
focus on the characteristics that distinguish MNCs from their national counterparts. 
Other than domestic businesses – even those that operate production facilities 
abroad, or export goods and know-how – MNCs have the capacity to flexibly move 
places of production and assets between countries. They structure management units 
independently of national borders and lose every tie to a nation state except for the 
formal nexus of incorporation. 19  This operational fluidity and the ensuing 
detachedness from domestic bounds are one of the main reasons why national 
legislators fail to put adequate checks on the power of MNCs, and why MNCs have 
moved into the focus of international law. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
 
The central debate on MNCs in international law focuses on the question of whether 
or not they are subjects of international law, that is, whether they are ‘capable of 
possessing international rights and duties, and [have] capacity to maintain [their] 
rights by bringing international claims’.20 Traditionally, international law was perceived 
as governing only the “mutual transactions between sovereigns”.21 With the rise of 
international organisations and international human rights law, however, the small 
circle of subjects of international law gradually expanded. Positivists assert that states 
– which remain the primary subjects of international law – can ‘upgrade’22 non-state 
actors to subjects of international law by endowing them with rights and obligations.23 
Non-state actors thus derive24 their subjectivity from states and are dependent on 
their recognition.  
 
Adhering to these formal prerequisites, the large majority of international legal 
scholars hold that MNCs do not possess international legal personality.25 It is argued 
that they have not been granted rights or obligations under international law26 and that 
although companies benefit from a range of international law provisions, they do not 
                                                     
16
 Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (n 10) 7. 
17
 Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Transnational Corporations Revisited’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 601, 604. 
18
 Gatto (n 3) 38. 
19
 See the detailed juxtaposition of MNCs and domestic enterprises in Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law (n 10) 7 f. 
20
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
174, 179. 
21
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Burns & Hart 1970) 296. 
22
 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Clarendon 1986) 103. 
23
 Karsten Nowrot, ‘Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential Non-State Actors: 
towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities’ in John Fleurs (ed), International Legal 
Personality (Ashgate 2010) 369, 372. 
24
 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law (7th edn, Routledge 1997) 104. 
25
 Nowrot (n 23) 372 with further extensive references; Cassese (n 22) 103; Malanczuk (n 24) 100; Kay 
Hailbronner, ‘Der Staat und der Einzelne als Völkerrechtssubjekte’ in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed), 
Völkerrecht (4th edn, De Gruyter 2007) 178; Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International Law’ (n 15); Eric 
De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: The Limits of Direct Corporate 
Responsibility’ (2010) 4 Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 66, 80; James Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 122. 
26
 Cassese (n 22) 103; Régis Bismuth, ‘Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders’ (2009/2010) 
38 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 203, 204. 
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necessarily enjoy corresponding rights.27 A few international legal scholars, on the 
other hand, have recognised MNCs as subjects of international law. Some have 
adopted a de facto approach based on their significant participation at the level of 
international law28 and on the growing privatisation of international law as evidenced 
by investment law and arbitration.29 Nowrot has gone further by completely breaking 
with the positivist view and asserting that a rebuttable presumption exists according to 
which MNCs are subjects of international law unless states and international 
organisations express the contrary in a legally binding form.30 Others have left the 
question open, 31  sometimes adding that there is no legal impediment to their 
ascension in the canon of the subjects of international law.32  
 
In an effort to overcome the traditional subject/object dichotomy which has generated 
extensive, ‘sterile’33 debates about the precise scope of the two categories, several 
legal scholars have advocated alternative approaches. Higgins powerfully described 
the classification into subjects and objects of international law as an ‘intellectual 
prison’ serving no ‘functional purpose’. 34  According to her, international law is a 
dynamic decision-making process in which no subjects and objects exist, but only a 
variety of participants, including MNCs.35 Clapham focuses on the capacity of non-
state actors to have rights and obligations and, affirming both, he consequently 
attributes limited international personality to MNCs.36 In a similar vein other scholars 
measure MNCs based on their roles and duties37  or rights and responsibilities,38 
instead of concentrating on the ‘label’39 they carry. Klabbers has ascribed a merely 
descriptive and normatively empty value to the concept of international legal 
subjectivity. He concludes that ‘personality is by no means a threshold which must be 
crossed before an entity can participate in international legal relations; instead, once 
an entity does participate, it may be usefully described as having a degree of 
international legal personality’.40  
 
Instead of taking a position in this discussion, the present chapter will follow Alvarez’ 
advice and focus on ‘addressing which international rules apply to corporations rather 
than whether corporations are or are not subjects of international law’.41  
 
                                                     
27
 See Malanczuk (n 24) 100: ‘The fact that individuals or companies are the beneficiaries of many rules 
of international law does not mean that these rules create rights for the individual or companies, in much 
the same way as laws prohibiting cruelty to animals do not create rights for animals’. 
28
 See David Adedayo Ijalaye, The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law (Oceana 
1978) 244 f; Dominique Carreau and Fabrizio Marrella, Droit international (11th ed, Pedone 2012) 66. 
29
 Zambrana Tévar (n 5) 401. 
30
 Nowrot (n 23) 379 ff. 
31
 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 250; Katarina Weilert, ‘Transnationale 
Unternehmen im rechtsfreien Raum? Geltung und Reichweite völkerrechtlicher Standards’ [2009] 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 883, 910. 
32
 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’ (2002) 297 Recueil des cours 112; 
Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau and Alain Pellet, Droit international public (8th ed, LGDJ 2009) 714 f. 
33
 Simon Chesterman, ‘Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict 
Zones’ (2010/2011) 11 Chicago Joumal of International Law 321, 327. 
34
 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 
1994) 49. 
35
 Ibid 50. 
36
 Clapham (n 14) 77 f. 
37
 See Merja Pentikäinen, ‘Changing International “Subjectivity” and Rights and Obligations under 
International Law – Status of Corporations’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 145, 153. 
38
 José E. Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 1, 31. 
39
 Pentikäinen (n 37) 153. 
40
 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd ed, CUP 2009) 52. 
41
 Alvarez (n 38) 31. 
 
8 
 
IV. RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Notwithstanding the discussion about their international legal subjectivity, it is widely 
recognised today that MNCs enjoy certain rights under international law, especially in 
the fields of international human rights law and investment protection.42 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) is unparalleled at the 
international level in granting companies protection under human rights law. Art. 34 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) provides ‘any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals’ with the right to claim 
a violation of its rights before the Court, comprising corporations within the scope of 
‘non-governmental organisation’.43 Companies have readily made use of this judicial 
option. Their claims invoke mostly Convention rights that do not necessarily 
presuppose an individual nexus,44 especially procedural rights, the right to freedom of 
expression, and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.  
 
Of these rights, only the latter expressly refers to legal persons (Art. 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR). However, the ECtHR has flexibly granted corporate applicants 
protection under a range of other Convention rights. Among these are the various due 
process guarantees of Art. 6(1) ECHR.45 Under the ECHR, companies enjoy a right to 
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,46 access to a 
court,47 equality of arms,48 and reasonable length of the proceedings.49 Frequently, 
media companies invoke the Convention on the grounds of alleged violations of the 
right to freedom of expression (Art. 10(1)). The ECtHR readily affirmed the 
applicability to companies in cases where the expression of opinion contained a 
political element,50 reflecting ‘controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in 
general’.51  
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR decided in favour of the corporate applicants in three sets of 
cases which were less clear-cut and engendered significant legal debates: the 
protection of business premises as ‘home’, the protection of purely commercial 
speech under the right to freedom of expression, and the award of monetary 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages (Art. 41 ECHR). 
The first of these cases arose under Art. 8(1) ECHR, which provides that ‘[e]veryone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence’. In Société Colas Est SA and Others v France (2002) the claimants 
sued France over raids of their business premises by investigators acting without a 
court warrant, arguing that their right to respect for their home had been violated. 
There were weighty arguments against an application of Art. 8(1) ECHR to company 
                                                     
42
 Wouters and Chanet (n 7) 342 ff; Clapham (n 14) 82; Gatto (n 3) 61; Alvarez (n 38) 31; Pentikäinen (n 
37) 148. 
43
 Winfried van den Muijsenbergh and Sam Rezai, ‘Corporations and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2012) 25 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 43, 48. 
44
 A term used by Emberland in the context of ECHR art 41, see Marius Emberland, The Human Rights 
of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (OUP 2006) 125 ff. 
45
 Ibid 14. 
46
 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine ECHR 2002-VII 95. 
47
 Silvester’s Horeca Service v Belgium App no 47650/99 (ECtHR, 4 March 2004). 
48
 Dombo Beheer B.V. v The Netherlands (1993) Series A no 274; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis 
Andreadis v Greece (1994) Series A no 301-B. 
49
 Unión Alimentaria Sanders SA v Spain (1989) Series A no 157. 
50
 Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) Series A no 30. 
51
 VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland ECHR 2001-VI 243; see also Sunday Times v The 
United Kingdom (n 50). 
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facilities, including the context of the provision, the drafting history, previous case law, 
as well as the narrow wording of the English text of the ECHR as opposed to the 
French term ‘domicile’.52 Notwithstanding, the ECtHR held that the character of the 
Convention as a living instrument required a dynamic interpretation of the provision to 
accommodate for changing conditions. It referred to the fact that companies enjoy a 
series of rights under the ECHR and concluded that ‘the time has come to hold that in 
certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention may be 
construed as including the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches 
or other business premises’.53  
 
Secondly, in Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) the ECtHR held that ‘corporate 
speech’ – communication in order to ‘incit[e] the public to purchase a particular 
product’54 – falls within the scope of Art. 10(1) ECHR. According to the Court, it is not 
necessary to ‘ascertain the reason and purpose for which the right is to be 
exercised’. 55  The prevention of a purely commercial reception of a television 
programme by Swiss authorities was considered to amount to an interference with the 
right to freedom of expression. 
 
The third case ensued when corporate applicants requested the payment of monetary 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages under Art. 41 ECHR, which grants 
successful applicants the entitlement to just satisfaction. In Comingersoll SA v 
Portugal (2001) the applicant had successfully argued that the length of a civil law suit 
before Portuguese courts constituted a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR. The company 
claimed monetary compensation for its non-pecuniary damage, arguing that a 
distinction between natural and legal persons in this respect was unfounded. 
According to the Portuguese government on the other hand, monetary compensation 
should be awarded only for ‘anxiety, the mental stress of having to wait for the 
outcome of the case and uncertainty’ – ‘feelings […] peculiar to natural persons’.56 
The ECtHR ruled in favour of the applicant. Adopting a nearly ‘anthropomorphi[c]’57 
approach, it held that companies can suffer non-pecuniary damage such as a loss of 
‘reputation, uncertainty in decision-planning, disruption in the management of the 
company […] and […] the anxiety and inconvenience caused to the members of the 
management team’.58 The protracted civil proceedings had caused the company, ‘its 
directors and shareholders considerable inconvenience and prolonged uncertainty’,59 
justifying the award of monetary compensation. 
 
It has to be noted that the approach of the Court to extend even those provisions of 
the Convention to corporate applicants that have traditionally been considered to 
apply only to individuals, is in some instances counterbalanced by a more lenient 
standard of review.60 With respect to Art. 10(2) ECHR the ECtHR established in Markt 
intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany (1989) that the state’s margin 
of appreciation is ‘essential in commercial matters’ so that the ‘Court must confine its 
review to the question whether the measures taken on the national level are justifiable 
                                                     
52
 Emberland (n 44) 114 f. 
53
 Société Colas Est and Others v France ECHR 2002-III 105, para 41. 
54
 VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (n 51) para 57. 
55
 Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) Series A no 178, para 47. 
56
 Comingersoll S.A. v Portugal ECHR 2000-IV 339, para 28. 
57
 Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck, ‘La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et la matière 
économique’ in Laurence Boy, Jean-Baptiste Racine, Fabrice Siiriainen (eds), Droit économique et droits 
de l’homme (Larcier 2009) 25, 37. 
58
 Comingersoll S.A. v Portugal (n 56) para 35. 
59
 Ibid para 36. 
60
 Emberland (n 44) 155 ff. 
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in principle and proportionate’.61 In Société Colas Est SA and Others v France (2002) 
the ECtHR held that the applicant company had been violated in its right under Art. 
8(1) ECHR, ‘even supposing that the entitlement to interfere may be more far-
reaching where the business premises of a juristic person are concerned’. 62 
Nevertheless, companies enjoy a unique level of protection under the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR, which has pioneered the application of human rights to corporate 
applicants. 
 
Outside the scope of the ECHR, international human rights protection for companies 
is dim. The UN Human Rights Committee, entrusted with overseeing the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
has recognised that notwithstanding the lack of explicit wording, legal entities may 
enjoy certain rights under the Covenant, such as the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or belief (Art. 18) and the freedom of association (Art. 22). 63  However, 
according to Art. 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, only individuals can claim 
the violation of their rights before the Human Rights Committee. Companies therefore 
have to rely on domestic fora in order to obtain protection of their rights. The 
American Convention on Human Rights on the other hand explicitly accords human 
rights protection only to human beings.64 Companies can bring petitions before the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but only pro victima on behalf of a 
natural person.65 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
International investment law grants MNCs the most robust rights. Customary 
international law, bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, as well as agreements 
between MNC and host state, establish a set of rules for the protection of foreign 
direct investment.  
 
Customary international law requires that for an expropriation to be lawful that it is 
undertaken in the public interest, without arbitrariness, and discrimination on the basis 
of nationality and accompanied by the payment of compensation.66 The latter has 
been the subject of protracted disagreements between developed and developing 
countries, especially in the framework of the former’s efforts to establish a New 
International Economic Order.67 Developed countries endorse the Hull formula, which 
requires the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.68 
 
                                                     
61
 Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany (1989) Series A no 165, para 33; 
confirmed eg in Casado Coca v Spain (1994) Series A no 285-A, para 50; Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG 
v Austria (No 3) (2003) ECHR 2003-XII 91, para 30. 
62
 Société Colas Est and Others v France (n 53) para 49. 
63
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 para 9. 
64
 American Convention on Human Rights (entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36 
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992) art 1(2). 
65
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure (2009) art 23; see also Julian Ku, 
‘The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law’ (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 
729 (750) with a reference to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ decision in Tabacalera 
Boquerón SA v Paraguay, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc 6.  
66
 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) 99 f. 
67
 Ibid 100. 
68
 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Wirtschaft und Kultur’ in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed), Völkerrecht (4th edn, De Gruyter 
2007) 519. 
 
11 
 
The late 1950s saw the conclusion of the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
designed to further and protect foreign direct investment. Today approximately 3,000 
BITs are in force, and while no uniform standard exists, a typical BIT contains 
provisions on the following questions: personal and temporal applicability, definition of 
investment, treatment of foreign investment, expropriation, currency transfer, and 
dispute settlement.69 Furthermore, many BITs include so-called ‘umbrella clauses’, 
which oblige the contracting parties to respect any other undertaking they may have 
entered into with regard to the investment of a national or a company of the other 
party, thereby elevating the contractual obligation with the investor into an 
international law obligation.70  
 
The contracting parties commit to observing certain standards with regard to foreign 
investors, such as fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, as well as 
non-discrimination. The latter requirement means that foreign investors may not be 
discriminated against, both compared to nationals of the host state (national 
treatment) and to investors from third countries (most-favoured nation treatment), 
although BITs can contain exceptions for members of an economic, tariff or monetary 
union, of a common market, or of a free trade area, as well as exceptions with regard 
to certain sensitive economic sectors.  
 
Provisions on dispute settlement are the most innovative feature of BITs. 71  They 
provide investors with the possibility to bring claims directly against the host state, 
thereby constituting a powerful enforcement mechanism and contributing to the 
effective protection of investment. Typically investors can choose between 
proceedings before a domestic court of the host state or arbitration, either under the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) 72  or through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).73  
 
BITs have been criticised for restricting the regulatory freedom of the host country 
and thereby hindering legislation for the protection of human rights or the 
environment. 74  Recent BITs take these objections into consideration and contain 
exception clauses to account for the public interest.75 Other initiatives have aimed at 
providing policy guidance for sustainable development, such as the UNCTAD 
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Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 76  and the IISD Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, which seeks to 
achieve a balance between the obligations of the host state, the home state and the 
investor.77 
 
A number of multilateral instruments contain similar provisions on investment 
protection, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the 1994 
Energy Charter Treaty. Between 1995 and 1998 the OECD made efforts to draft a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in order to replace the multitude of BITs. 
Strong opposition by NGOs and developing countries, lack of support by the business 
world, and disagreements between the negotiating parties, particularly about sectoral 
exceptions as well as social and environmental issues, ultimately led to the 
abandonment of the project. A subsequent initiative under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) failed in 2004 due to concerns of the developing world 
about undue restrictions of their regulatory freedom.78  
 
V. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Since the 1970s a range of initiatives has attempted to close the perceived 
‘governance gap’ and to rein in the power of MNCs by subjecting them to binding 
obligations under international law. Their success has been limited. According to the 
prevailing view, MNCs have no direct obligations under international law,79 although 
there is a growing body of non-binding ‘soft law’ regulating their conduct. 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
MNCs can directly impact human rights in the societies they operate in, e.g. by 
employing children or forced workers, by operating on the territories of indigenous 
people without their consent, by using discriminatory recruitment policies, or by 
damaging the environment and thus endangering the life and health of people. They 
can also indirectly cause harm if they create incentives for state authorities to violate 
human rights for business purposes or if they support regimes engaged in human 
rights violations by providing infrastructure, financial means, or international 
credibility.  
 
Under current international human rights law, however, States are the primary duty 
bearers, obliged to respect and fulfil human rights and to ensure their protection 
against abuses by private actors.80 While they have enacted domestic legislation to 
regulate the conduct of companies chartered or operating in their territory, they have 
not yet imposed directly binding human rights obligations on them under international 
law.81 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that ‘every organ of 
society’ – a term which possibly includes MNCs82 – ‘shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms’. However, this statement 
is only contained in the preamble, which has not hardened into customary 
international law.83 For the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated 
that it does not have direct horizontal effect,84 while the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights observed with regard to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that ‘private enterprises [are] not 
bound by the Covenant’.85 Art. 1 of the ECHR binds only the ‘high contracting parties 
[to] secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention’.86  
 
The lack of direct binding obligations for MNCs under international human rights law 
has been the subject of considerable criticism. One of the main causes of concern is 
a perceived ‘protection gap’87 if the safeguarding of human rights is left entirely to the 
states: first, because of the uneven status of recognition of human rights instruments 
in the various jurisdictions; second, because of their disparate enforcement, which is 
closely connected to the strength of the domestic legal system and the dependence 
on foreign investment of the respective states.88 Another major ground for criticism is 
the ‘governance gap’,89 which results from the discrepancy between the power of 
MNCs to severely harm human rights and the inability of domestic legislators to take 
effective measures in this respect. Some legal scholars have also criticised the one-
sidedness of international human rights law which grants MNCs significant rights and 
benefits without holding them liable for abuses. 90  There are, however, not only 
concerns about the effective protection of human rights norms. Commentators have 
also pointed out, that companies suffer significant disadvantages due to the legal 
uncertainty of the current regime. Companies can incur increased costs and sustain 
reputational damage when they are measured according to human rights standards 
by which they are not even legally bound.91  
 
Various approaches have been proposed to hold companies accountable under 
international human rights law. It has been argued that MNCs should incur direct 
liability for human rights abuses.92 One of the initiatives to this effect was the drafting 
of the UN Draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
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business enterprises with regard to human rights which will be treated in more detail 
below.93 Fears of diluting the responsibilities of states and undermining their authority 
as well as the inapplicability of many human rights norms to private actors have 
effectively hindered the success of the Draft Norms, although a recent initiative in the 
Human Rights Council has re-opened the discussion on a legally binding human 
rights instrument for MNCs.94 Others have advocated the imposition of aiding and 
abetting liability on MNCs for their complicity in human rights violations. The ensuing 
questions of mens rea and attribution have not yet been satisfactorily answered.95 In 
light of the considerable resistance at the political, legal, and business level to impose 
binding human rights obligations on MNCs, a host of non-binding ‘soft law’ 
instruments has seen the light of day, which seeks to set certain human rights 
standards for MNCs. They have been lauded as a ‘step in the right direction’96 and 
are sometimes regarded as a precursor for binding rules. Critics, however, consider 
them inadequate to effectively protect human rights and ensure legal certainty for the 
private sector.97 It has been argued that this ‘illusion of regulation’ may be ‘worse than 
no regulation at all’.98  
 
1. UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights 
 
The Draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights (Draft Norms) were an ambitious 
attempt to create binding international human rights obligations for MNCs.99 Drafted 
by a working group under the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights and adopted in 2003 in the form of a resolution by the latter, they 
were rejected by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which 
stated in unequivocal terms that the draft had ‘not been requested’ and had ‘no legal 
standing’.100 
 
The Draft Norms were an innovative initiative insofar as they sought to directly apply 
human rights rules to MNCs, elevating them to full-fledged duty bearers under 
international human rights law.101 Even though the primary responsibility of states was 
recognised, MNCs were obliged to ‘promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure 
respect of and protect’102 a broad range of human rights. Implementation measures 
included the adoption, dissemination, and implementation of internal rules of 
operation, periodic reporting duties as well as monitoring and verification by the 
UN.103 However, the Draft Norms have been criticised for simply imposing on MNCs 
human rights instruments which are addressed to states. 104  Apart from the 
questionable legal basis for this move and ensuing practical difficulties, it was also 
feared that such an approach might result in a dilution of state responsibility and a 
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weakening of sovereignty.105 Extensive criticism led to the abandonment of the project 
and to the readjustment of international efforts. 
 
2. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
 
After the failure of the Draft Norms, the CHR established the mandate of a Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (SRSG), tasked with 
identifying and clarifying existing standards and practices. The Secretary General 
appointed John Ruggie, one of the authors of the Global Compact and influential critic 
of the Draft Norms.  
 
In the first phase of his mandate (2005-2007), the SRSG conducted an extensive 
mapping of international standards and practices which then served as the basis for 
the formulation of recommendations during the second phase (2007-2008). He 
developed a three pillar framework, consisting of (1) the state duty to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights, (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and 
(3) the need for effective remedy for victims of human rights abuses (‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework’ or ‘Ruggie Framework’). In the last phase (2008-
2011), he elaborated specific recommendations for the implementation of the 
Framework, resulting in the development of the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights which were endorsed by the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 16 June 
2011.  
 
The first pillar of the Ruggie Framework highlights that states are the primary duty 
bearers under international human rights law. It is their obligation to respect and fulfil 
human rights and to protect them against abuses, including those committed by 
MNCs. This requires states among other to enact, assess, and enforce human rights 
legislation, to ensure policy coherence, to provide guidance on human rights issues to 
companies – especially to those operating in conflict zones – and to promote respect 
for human rights by business partners. 
 
The second pillar focuses on the responsibility of business entities to respect all 
internationally recognised human rights, which requires them to “avoid causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts […] and address such impacts when 
they occur” and to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business 
relationships”.106 The responsibility of companies thereby differs significantly from the 
obligations of states. Whereas states have comprehensive duties to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights, companies are merely responsible for ensuring that they do 
not abuse the human rights of others. The Guiding Principles recommend them to 
adopt “(a) a policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; 
(b) a human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address their impacts on human rights; (c) processes to enable the 
remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they 
contribute”.107 Rejecting previous efforts to compile lists of human rights which are 
applicable to companies, the SRSG stated that “business enterprises can have an 
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impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognised human rights” and 
concluded that their “responsibility to respect applies to all such rights”.108 
 
The third pillar recognizes the importance of effective access to remedy for the victims 
of human rights abuses, identifying responsibilities for both states and businesses. 
States should ensure the effectiveness of judicial grievance mechanisms and provide 
access to non-judicial and non-state-based grievance mechanisms. Businesses 
should establish or participate in the latter and ensure that their collaborative 
voluntary human rights initiatives provide for dispute settlement procedures. 
 
“Principled pragmatism” is the label that the SRSG has often given to his approach.109 
Opting for a broad and transparent multi-stakeholder process he set out to move 
beyond the failure of the Draft Norms and to establish an “authoritative focal point 
around which actors’ expectations could converge”. 110  Rather than laying down 
principles de lege ferenda he reiterated the existing obligations of states under human 
rights law and connected them to a voluntary corporate governance framework.111 
 
The result has led both to praise and criticism.112 Supporters have lauded the open 
consultative process for successfully creating awareness for the problem 113  and 
appreciated the clear demarcation between state obligations and corporate 
responsibilities. The business world, which has consistently rallied against the 
imposition of binding human rights obligations and was starkly opposed to the Draft 
Norms, welcomed the Guiding Principles, although a 2013 study by 
Aaronson/Higham shows little impact on corporate practices so far.114 Governments 
reacted equally favourably and a number of domestic and regional efforts to 
implement the Guiding Principles have seen the light of day.115 NGOs, on the other 
hand, have generally been more supportive of the Draft Norms and criticised the 
‘regressive’ 116  approach of the Guidelines to attribute merely non-binding 
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responsibilities to companies. Critics also deplored the preference of process over 
substance, referring to the failure of the Guiding Principles to establish a clear 
normative framework as a reference point against which the human rights 
performance of the business entity can be measured.117 
 
Following up on the work of the SRSG, the HRC created a Working Group to promote 
dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles and launched an annual 
Forum on Business and Human Rights to strengthen dialogue and cooperation.118 
Bringing together participants from governments, businesses and civil society 
organisations around the world, the annual Forum provides an opportunity to discuss 
trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles. 119  The 
mandate of the Working Group was extended for another period of three years in 
2014.120 
 
3. Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 
 
Two years after the adoption of the Guiding Principles, the representative of Ecuador 
delivered a statement during the 24th session of the Human Rights Council, re-
opening the discussion by pushing for a legally binding human rights instrument for 
MNCs.121 The statement was supported by a large number of states, including the 
African Group, the Arab Group, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan and several 
GRULAC states.  
 
At the 26th session of the Human Rights Council, Ecuador and South Africa jointly 
tabled a draft resolution which provided for the establishment of an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group (‘IGWG’) on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights. The mandate of the IGWG 
comprises the elaboration of a binding human rights instrument, governing the 
activities of MNCs and other business enterprises. The draft was co-sponsored by 
Algeria, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Senegal and Venezuela and it was 
adopted as Resolution 26/9 by 20 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions.122 Among the no 
voters were the United States, Japan, South Korea and the EU Member States. The 
proponents of the resolution argued, that while the Guiding Principles could be 
considered as a first step, a merely voluntary international framework was ultimately 
insufficient to provide the victims of corporate human rights abuses with the 
necessary legal protection, particularly given the often weak level of binding national 
regulation. The opponents of the resolution referred to the success of the Guiding 
Principles, the implementation of which would be threatened through the re-opened 
divisive discussion on a binding instrument. They stressed the importance of national 
implementation plans and the inappropriateness of a ‘one size fits all’ approach.123 
                                                     
117
 Rory Sullivan and Nicolas Hachez, ‘Human Rights Norms for Business: The Missing Piece of the 
Ruggie Jigsaw – The Case of Institutional Investors’ in Radu Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Nijhoff 2012) 217, 227 ff. 
118
 UNHRC Res 17/4 (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4. 
119
 OHCHR, ‘United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights’, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx> 
accessed 30 December 2014. 
120
 UNHRC Res 26/22 (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/22. 
121
 Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 
‘Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’, General Debate – Item 3, September 2013, 
<http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-
binding.pdf> accessed 30 December 2014. 
122
 UNHRC Res 26/9 (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9. 
123
 Human Rights Council, ‘Council extends mandates on extreme poverty, international solidarity, 
independence of judges, and trafficking in persons’, 26 June 2014, 
 
18 
 
The IGWG is scheduled to launch its first deliberations and stakeholder consultations 
on a potential binding instrument in July 2015.  
 
4. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a set of non-binding 
recommendations for responsible business conduct that the participating 
governments address to MNCs which operate in or from their territory. The first 
Guidelines were adopted in 1976, with the aim to improve the foreign investment 
climate by strengthening cooperation among OECD Member States and reducing the 
difficulties arising from the operations of MNCs. A revised version, adopted in 2000, 
recommended MNCs to ‘respect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities’ 124  for the first time. The latest revision in 2011 expanded this 
recommendation by introducing an entire chapter on human rights. Echoing the 
provisions of the Guiding Principles, it requests MNCs to respect human rights, avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts, address and seek ways to 
prevent or mitigate these impacts, have a policy commitment to respect human rights, 
carry out human rights due diligence, and provide for remediation of adverse human 
rights impacts. The 2011 revision also introduced a new approach to responsible 
supply chain management, extending the Guidelines beyond the immediate 
operations of the MNCs to their relations with e.g. subcontractors or franchisees. 
 
Implementation of the Guidelines lies in the hands of the adhering states, the MNCs, 
the National Contact Points (NCPs) and the Investment Committee. Each adhering 
state is required to set up an NCP, tasked with promoting the Guidelines, handling 
inquiries, and solving disputes. Their role, which has not been uniformly successful,125 
was enhanced by the 2011 revision. If an issue arises under the Guidelines, they will 
contribute to its solution by making an initial assessment, offering good offices, and 
publishing the results of the procedure. If necessary, they are assisted by the 
Investment Committee 126  which also provides advice on the interpretation of the 
Guidelines. The outcome of these procedures is, however, necessarily non-binding 
and the names of the companies involved are typically not disclosed in order to 
protect confidential information. 127  Their effect has thus been characterised as 
‘commercial rather than legal’.128  
 
5. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy 
 
The ILO Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and 
social policy is a non-binding instrument which was adopted after tripartite 
                                                                                                                                                         
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14785&LangID=E> accessed 
30 December 2014. 
124
 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000) <www.oecd.org/investment/mne/1922428.pdf> 
accessed 5 December 2013, Part I, ch II, para 2. 
125
 Wouters and Ryngaert (n 6) 972 ff; Walczak (n 91) 646; Zambrana Tévar (n 5) 404. 
126
 The OECD Investment Committee is tasked with the interpretation and implementation of the 
Guidelines. It monitors the functioning of the Guidelines, provides a forum for discussion as well as for 
dispute resolution, offers recommendations and issues reviews and analyses. The Committee was 
established in 2004, merging the former Committee on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises (CIME) and the former Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT). 
For more information see the On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity, 
<www2.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/Bodies/ShowBodyView.aspx?BodyID=7232&Lang=en&Book=True> 
accessed 5 December 2013. 
127
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (n 12) Part II, Procedural Guidance, para C.3. See 
Zambrana Tévar (n 5) 404. 
128
 De Brabandere (n 25) 82. 
 
19 
 
negotiations between workers’ and employers’ organisations and state governments 
in 1977 and has since been amended twice in 2000 and 2006. 129  Reacting to 
concerns about labour standards and social issues, the Declaration contains 
principles on employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial 
relations, which ‘governments, employers’ and workers’ organisations and 
multinational enterprises are recommended to observe on a voluntary basis’. 130 
Without providing for a complaints mechanism similar to the one under the OECD 
Guidelines, the Declaration merely envisages periodic surveys in order to measure its 
effectiveness and a clarification process, whereby the parties may submit requests for 
interpretation to the ILO. 
 
6. Global Compact 
 
The Global Compact is a ‘soft law’ policy initiative for businesses which voluntarily 
commit to respect and support ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the 
environment, and anti-corruption, derived from the UDHR, the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and the UN Convention Against Corruption. The Global Compact was 
announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 and was officially launched 
in 2000. Today it counts more than 10,000 participants from over 130 countries, 
making it the largest non-binding corporate responsibility initiative world-wide. 131 
Companies have to submit an annual report on the implementation of the ten 
principles, which, however, is not subject to any review mechanism and has 
consequently been labelled a mere ‘public relations exercise’. 132  Supporters have 
lauded its contribution to raising awareness for the underlying issues, however, critics 
decry the lack of monitoring and audit, both for potential and current candidates.133 
 
7. Self-regulation 
 
Rejecting the need for ‘hard law’, MNCs have frequently opted for voluntary initiatives 
in which they pledge their respect and support for human rights.134 The variety of 
existing instruments is broad, comprising codes of conduct, transparency initiatives, 
and social labels. They can have ‘soft’ positive effects by putting the spotlight on 
human rights issues and evidencing a certain recognition of responsibility by the 
respective companies, thus possibly preparing the ground for binding regulation.135 It 
could also be argued that these voluntary commitments have very tangible legal 
consequences: failure to comply with a self-imposed code of conduct could amount to 
deceptive advertisement136  or evidence a company’s violation of its duty of care, 
entailing liability for damages under tort law.137  
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Nevertheless, the overall merits and legitimacy of corporate human rights self-
regulation are disputed. Among the plethora of initiatives, the majority does not 
provide for independent third-party compliance monitoring or even transparent and 
accurate self-evaluation and most employ vague and aspirational language instead of 
making precise and comprehensive human rights commitments. 138  It has been 
observed that it might be ‘inappropriate’ to leave human rights questions to corporate 
self-regulation and unwise to assign companies a role which they are unable to 
fulfil.139 Some authors have even pointed to the danger that self-regulation might ‘give 
the appearance of regulation and thereby ward off criticism and the imposition of 
external regulation’.140  
 
8. Enforcement 
 
MNCs incur no direct legal obligations under international human rights law and 
consequently no enforcement mechanism under international law exists. The picture 
changes, however, if one takes a look at the national level, where MNCs have been 
sued for human rights abuses before civil and criminal tribunals.141 
 
The most prominent cases were argued in the United States under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which provides district courts with jurisdiction ratione materiae for ‘any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States’.142 Having fallen into oblivion after its adoption in 1789,143 
the statute was rediscovered in the landmark case Filártiga v Peña-Irala (1980)144 
where the Second Circuit ruled in favour of two Paraguayan citizens who had sued a 
fellow countryman over a case of torture that had taken place in Paraguay. The Court 
assumed subject-matter jurisdiction because ‘deliberate torture perpetrated under 
colour of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law 
of human rights’.145  In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain (2004)146  the US Supreme Court 
affirmed jurisdiction for violations of those international norms which are ‘specific, 
universal, and obligatory’.147 
 
The ATS quickly became a popular tool for human rights activists to hold perpetrators 
of human rights abuses accountable. In 1995 the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Kadic v Karadzic (1995)148 opened the door for claims against non-state 
actors acting without state involvement. Soon, the first successful law suit against a 
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corporate entity, Doe v Unocal (1997),149 followed. However, legal uncertainty about 
the relationship between domestic US law and international law persisted. Especially 
the question whether the scope of liability should be governed by international or 
domestic law remained contentious.  
 
The US Supreme Court commented on this issue in a footnote of the judgment in 
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, stating that ‘[a] related consideration is whether international 
law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator 
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual’.150 
Picking up on this, the majority in the Second Circuit decision Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum (2010)151 concluded that the scope of liability – including the question of 
corporate liability – must be determined by international law instead of domestic law. 
After an analysis of decisions of international tribunals, treaties, and the opinions of 
international legal scholars, it decided that corporate liability is no ‘specific, universal 
and obligatory’ norm of international law and can therefore not ‘form the basis of a 
suit under the ATS’ – thus sounding the ‘death knell’152 for corporate liability under the 
ATS. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011 but requested the parties to 
submit additional briefs on the extraterritorial application of the ATS. Without referring 
to the issue of corporate liability, the Supreme Court held in April 2013 that ‘the 
presumption against extraterritoriality’ – ‘which provides that when a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none’153 – ‘applies to claims 
under the ATS’,154 thereby barring all claims which do not ‘touch and concern the 
territory of the United States […] with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application’.155 This effectively ended the role of the ATS as a 
‘bonanza’156 for human rights activists.  
 
It should also be noted that even without legal enforcement mechanisms human 
rights abuses can be costly for MNCs. Tried in the court of public opinion, they can 
suffer considerable reputational and financial damage through strikes and boycotts as 
well as loss of investor and consumer confidence. NGO pressure as illustrated by the 
‘Green Scissors Campaign’ can cost companies substantial sums in incentives and 
subsidies.157 These external factors can then translate into internal pressure through 
shareholder resolutions.158 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are addressed primarily at states and 
have at most indirect regulatory implications for MNCs. In accordance with the 
fundamental ‘polluter pays’ principle,159 a few specialised agreements establish civil 
liability rules for private actors which have the potential to cause particularly grave 
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environmental damage, such as oil spills or nuclear leakages. 160  All of these 
instruments rely on domestic implementation, and require the contracting parties to 
establish the necessary enforcement mechanisms. Noteworthy are also the 
provisions on sustainable development in the non-binding OECD Guidelines and 
Agenda 21, last reaffirmed at the Rio+20 conference.161 Compared to international 
human rights law, self-regulation by companies through codes of conduct or 
certification systems, e.g. so called eco-labels, is more developed. 162  While the 
systems’ institutional designs vary considerably, many provide for third- or second-
party conformity assessments and a few contain dispute settlement or appeal 
mechanisms.163 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
International criminal law does not and has never provided for jurisdiction over legal 
persons. Already the first international criminal tribunal, the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg, only exercised jurisdiction over individuals. It famously held: 
‘Crimes against International Law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
International Law be enforced’.164 Neither of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
which were subsequently created by the UN Security Council exercised jurisdiction 
over corporate entities. The 1998 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, on 
the other hand, provided that ‘the Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal 
persons, with the exception of states, when the crimes committed were committed on 
behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives’.165 This approach 
was later abandoned, firstly because corporate criminal accountability is unknown to 
many domestic legal systems, which would have caused difficulties for the application 
of the complementarity principle,166 and secondly because some feared that states 
might be considered hypocritical if they established criminal responsibility for every 
entity except for themselves. 167  The extension of jurisdiction to corporate entities 
made it onto the agenda of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, but received only 
limited attention due to the strong focus on the crime of aggression.168  
 
There are, however, several domestic jurisdictions which recognise the criminal 
liability of legal persons, among them Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.169  
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It is also noteworthy that several international instruments contain criminal liability 
provisions for legal persons, such as the European Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law, the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, the United Nations Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime. All of these conventions oblige the state parties to establish the liability of legal 
persons for the commission of crimes as defined under the respective instrument. 
Liability is, however, never reduced to criminal liability alone, but leaves the Member 
States a leeway to adopt administrative or civil measures instead. 
 
VI. CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 
 
Although states are the primary creators of international law, MNCs have various 
avenues at their disposal to shape the law making process. They can contribute to 
the work of the ILO through the ‘tripartism’ mechanism and pursue their interests in 
international investment arbitration or (through WTO Members) WTO dispute 
settlement. Above all, they can use their political, social, and economic power to 
influence the legislative process by lobbying at the national level of the respective 
Member State, at the EU and international level, or by participating in dialogue and 
consultation. However, conflicting policy goals of states or international organisations 
as well as NGO activism can limit the clout of MNCs.170 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued in this chapter that, on the one hand, MNCs can contribute to 
economic and technological development, increasing the wealth and the living 
conditions of society. They therefore merit protection against undue government 
interference and for the safeguarding of a stable and reliable business environment. 
On the other hand, MNCs can severely impact human rights or the environment and 
even commit crimes for which they should be held accountable. Both objectives are 
insufficiently achieved at the domestic level. MNCs defy concepts of nationality and 
elude the grip of the – unwilling or unable – national legislator. But the turn to 
international law has encountered difficulties as well. Lengthy debates about the 
international legal subjectivity of MNCs have precluded involvement with the 
substantive question of the rights and obligations of companies under international 
law. Subjectivity has been used as a threshold, awaiting the positive granting of rights 
and obligations by states. This cannot, however, hide the fact that MNCs already 
enjoy considerable rights under international investment law and under international 
human rights law. They can ensure protection of their assets before domestic courts 
and through arbitration processes and can claim violations of their rights before the 
ECtHR. Conversely, MNCs do not have binding obligations under international law. 
Most importantly, they are not bound by international human rights law, 
notwithstanding a range of initiatives, attempting to create both voluntary and non-
voluntary instruments. At most, they bear certain responsibilities not to harm human 
rights, but implementation and enforcement depend on the respective government 
authorities. 
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In light of the ever growing power of MNCs and considering ongoing reports about 
their involvement in human rights abuses and environmental harm, the calls for 
stronger obligations of MNCs under international law persist. Caution should be 
exercised, though, since a single-minded focus on MNCs risks distracting from the 
primary responsibility of states. Here, many instruments are readily available which 
might benefit from increased attention and achieve similar results. The ‘Ruggie 
Framework’ has set in motion a development, which provides for heightened MNC 
responsibility without diluting the primary responsibility of states. Whether the new 
initiative towards a legally binding human rights instrument will manage to overcome 
the existing political divisions or share the fate of earlier attempts to move beyond a 
voluntary framework, remains to be seen. 
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